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The Volcker Rule: A Reminder
of the Need for Additional
Remedies for Party-to-Party
NAFTA Disputes
Jacob H. Cappel 1
When the Volcker Rule was enacted, and its proposed
regulations were released, a shockwave of fear and uncertainty
reverberated through the international community. The Volcker
Rule, as proposed, had unprecedented extraterritorial effects on
foreign financial institutions. The agencies in charge of
implementing the Rule received thousands of letters from state
officials and private investors across the globe expressing their
fears and concerns. In one letter, the five largest banks in
Canada argued that the Rule violated the United States’ North
American Free Trade Agreement obligations. Finally, almost
four years after its enactment, the Rule’s final regulations were
published, which substantially allayed foreign officials’ and
investors’ anxieties. The Rule, however, still has extraterritorial
effects and more specifically, does in fact violate the United
States’ obligations under the North American Free Trade
Agreement. , This unchecked violation acts as a reminder of the
need for additional remedies to prevent future North American
Free Trade Agreement violations. Flawless enforcement and
prevention may not be practical, but establishing an appellate
review system of North American Free Trade Agreement panel
decisions, and imposing more stringent penalties on violating
parties, could mitigate future violations.

1.

B.A. Economics, Whitman College; J.D. Candidate Case Western
Reserve University School of Law.
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I. Introduction
“The generality of men are naturally apt to be swayed by fear
rather than reverence, and to refrain from evil rather because of
the punishment that it brings than because of its own foulness.”
—Aristotle 2

2.

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. X, ch. 9 (G.P. Goold ed., H.
Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press ed. 1934) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
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Congress and President Obama responded to the 2008 financial
crisis by passing the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 3 which included the
Volcker Rule (the “Rule”), 4 named for former Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Paul Volcker, who long advocated for the Rule. 5 The
Rule was designed to protect Americans against another financial
crisis by barring depository banks from using their depositors’ money
for short-term and speculative trading. 6 The Rule, however, has been
met with a barrage of criticism from domestic as well as foreign
officials and financial institutions. 7 Before the Rule’s regulations were
finalized, foreign officials feared that the Rule would adversely affect
their banks and reduce liquidity of the market for their sovereign
bonds. 8 Specifically, the European Banking Federation criticized the
Rule’s extraterritorial reach, which would allow the Rule to interfere
3.

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Act (Dodd-Frank) of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
The Dodd-Frank Act was passed “[t]o promote the financial stability of
the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect customers from abusive financial
services practices, and for other purposes.” Id. at pmbl.

4.

Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 2, § 619 (12 U.S.C. § 1851) [hereinafter
Volcker Rule].

5.

Ben Protess & Peter Eavis, At the Finish Line on the Volcker Rule,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013, 10:59 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/12/10/regulators-vote-to-approve-volcker-rule/.

6.

See Volcker Rule, supra note 3, § 1851(a)(1); Barack Obama, President
of the United States, Remarks by the President on Financial Reform
(Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-financial-reform (“We simply cannot accept a
system in which hedge funds or private equity firms inside banks can
place huge, risky bets that are subsidized by taxpayers . . ..”). President
Obama called the Rule, “simple and common-sense reform.” Id.
Evidence showed that speculative trading had a huge impact on the
2008 crisis; “[w]hen all the dust settled, a report by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office showed that ‘during [the] five
quarters spanning the financial crisis . . . proprietary trading accounted
for $15.8 billin in losses’ at the six largest bank holding companies.” R.
Rex Chatterjee, Dictionaries Fail: The Volcker Rule’s Reliance on
Definitions Renders it Ineffective and a New Solution Is Needed to
Adequately Regulate Proprietary Trading, 8 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT.
REV. 33, 48 (2011) (citing Scott Patterson & Victoria McGrane, The
Multibillion-Dollar Leak, THE WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204294504576615382298
044.).

7.

See generally Andrew Ross Sorkin, Volcker Rule Stirs Up Opposition
Overseas, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012, 8:59 PM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/volcker-rule-stirs-up-oppositionoverseas/?_r=0.

8.

See id.
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with their own regulation of their financial systems. 9 Canada’s five
largest banks argued that the Rule, as proposed, violated the United
States’ obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”), by treating Canadian debt securities less favorably than
United States’ debt securities. 10 On December 10, 2013, more than
three years after it was passed, 11 the Rule’s regulations were finalized
and published, 12 which allayed the anxieties that foreign financial
9.

Letter from Guido Ravoet, Chief Executive, European Banking
Federation, to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System et
al., Subject: Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and
Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private
Equity
Funds
(Feb.
13,
2012),
available
at
http://
www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2012/February/20120221/R-1432/R1432_021312_104924_515251389875_1.pdf [hereinafter EBF Letter]
(“It is the position of the [European Banking Federation] that the
Volcker Rule’s extraterritorial application to global non-U.S. operations
of non-U.S. banks should be reconsidered. This view is shaped by the
very real possibility that the application of the Volcker Rule, as
currently proposed, would interfere with the rights of non-U.S.
jurisdictions to regulate and supervise their banks. This could lead to an
unintended reduction in much needed international cooperation amongst
supervisory authorities, a situation which would inevitably lead to
greater regulatory divergence.”).

10.

See Letter from the Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada & TorontoDominion Bank to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al.,
Re: Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds 2 (Jan. 19,
2012),
available
at
http://www.cba.ca/
contents/files/misc/
msc_20120119_banksvolcker_bil.pdf [hereinafter Canadian Banks
Letter]; see also North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), available at http://www.
worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/nafta.pdf [hereinafter NAFTA].

11.

See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 2.

12.

Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain
Interests In, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity
Funds (Dec. 10, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 248 & 351 &
17 C.F.R. pt. 255), available at http://www.sec.gov/ rules/
final/2013/bhca-1.pdf [hereinafter Final Regulations]. The agencies in
charge of implementing the Rule received a lot of input leading up to
the finalized regulations, which undoubtedly contributed to the delay.
For example, on December 13, 2012, the House Subcommittee on
Financial Services held a hearing regarding the Rule’s potential impact
on the economy, where the Subcommittee heard from numerous
organizations regarding the Rule’s potential adverse effects on the U.S.
economy. See Examining the Impact of the Volcker Rule on Markets,
Businesses, Investors and Job Creation, Part II Before the Committee
on Financial Services, 112th Cong. 112-64 (2012), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/112–64.pdf. Moreover,
the Federal Stability Oversight Council received over 8,000 publiccomment letters in response to the proposed regulations, which sought
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institutions originally faced, by curtailing the Rule’s extraterritorial
reach. 13
This Note argues that the Rule illustrates and reiterates the need
for additional remedies under NAFTA’s recourse mechanisms, because
the current remedies are ineffective at holding NAFTA members
accountable for their NAFTA obligations. The Rule, which violates
the United States’ obligations under NAFTA, is subject to two
different NAFTA challenges: First, under Chapter Eleven, an
investor 14 could file an arbitration claim for damages if she alleged
that the Rule violates the United States’ Chapter Eleven obligations.15
Second, under Chapter Twenty, a party 16 could initiate a challenge—
entailing a three-step process 17—of the Rule as a violation of the
United States’ NAFTA obligations under any part of NAFTA, which,
if the process is followed through, would result in a decision by a fivemember arbitral panel. 18 These mechanisms, however, have proved to
be ineffective in holding NAFTA parties accountable for violations,
especially the United States. Therefore, the Rule reiterates the need
for additional remedies under NAFTA’s recourse mechanisms.
input on 350 questions. See Charles A. Piasio, It’s Complicated: Why
the Volcker Rule is Unworkable, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 737, 745 (2013).
13.

See Erica Alini, The Volcker Rule Revamp Is a Big Win for Canada,
CAN. BUS. (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.canadianbusiness.com/blogsand-comment/the-volcker-rule-spares-canadian-government-bonds/. The
Rule’s final regulations contained an exemption for foreign banks, which
was not contained in the proposed regulations. See Final Regulations,
supra note 11, at 404; see also Proposed Regulations, infra note 60.

14.

For purposes of this Note, the term “investor” takes on NAFTA
definition of investor. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1139 (“[I]nvestor
of a Party means a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an
enterprise of such Party, that seeks to make, is making or has made an
investment.”). An enterprise is “any entity constituted or organized
under applicable law, whether or not for profit and whether privatelyowned or governmentally-owned, including any corporation, trust,
partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture or other association.” Id.
art. 201.

15.

Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of Another
Party, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/ Default.
aspx?tabid=93&language=en-US (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); see also
NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1116.

16.

For the purposes of this Note, the term “party” means a party to
NAFTA, i.e., Canada, Mexico, or the United States.

17.

See Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures,
NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/ Default.
aspx?tabid=93&language=en-US (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); see also
NAFTA, supra note 9, arts. 2006-2008.

18.

Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures, supra
note 16. For the benefit of the reader, the Chapter Twenty five-member
arbitral panel will be referred to simply as “panel” throughout this Note.
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Part II of this Note provides a background to NAFTA, focusing
on Chapters Eleven (Investment), Fourteen (Financial Services), and
Twenty (Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement
Procedures), because they are most applicable to the Rule. Part III
explains why the Rule may violate NAFTA Chapters Eleven and
Fourteen. Part IV explores the two current NAFTA recourse
mechanisms listed above (available under Chapters Eleven and
Twenty), and explains the futility of each in general and when
specifically applied to the Rule. Part V looks at additional NAFTA
remedies, specifically appellate review of Chapter Twenty decisions,
and an assessment of compensatory damages against a noncomplying
party. Part V also makes a case for why these additional remedies are
steps in the right direction to enhance parties’ compliance with
NAFTA.

II. Background
In 1994, the United States, Canada, and Mexico entered into
NAFTA 19 in order to “create an expanded and secure market for the
goods and services produced in their territories,” and “establish clear
and mutually advantageous rules governing their trade,” among other
things. 20 Since its inception, NAFTA has produced economic growth
throughout North America, including higher-paying jobs and
enhanced choice and purchasing power for North American
consumers, families, farmers, and businesses. 21 In 2009, United States
foreign direct investment in the other NAFTA parties was $357.7
billion and the other NAFTA parties’ foreign direct investment in the
United States was $237.2 billion. 22 These figures represented a
significant portion of each countries’ gross domestic product,
especially Mexico and Canada. 23
19.

See NAFTA, NAFTANOW, http://www.naftanow.org (last modified
Apr. 12, 2012).

20.

NAFTA, supra note 9, pmbl.

21.

Results: North Americans Are Better Off After 15 Years of NAFTA,
NAFTANOW, http://www.naftanow.org/results/default_en.asp (last
modified May 6, 2013). According to NAFTANOW website, since 1993,
there has been a net gain of 39.7 million jobs in North America and the
combined gross domestic product of the parties has more than doubled.
Id.

22.

NAFTA, OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreementnafta (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).

23.

For example, the $237.2 billion for Mexico and Canada, represented
10.6% of their combined gross domestic product in 2009. See World
DataBank, WORLD BANK, http://databank.worldbank.org/ data/views/
reports/tableview.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); see also World
DataBank, WORLD BANK, http://databank.worldbank.org/ data/ views/
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From a legal perspective, NAFTA offers three different recourse
avenues for NAFTA violations: First, Chapter Eleven enables
investors to file arbitration claims against parties for alleged Chapter
Eleven violations. 24 Second, Chapter Twenty enables parties to
initiate a dispute resolution process regarding the interpretation or
application of any part of NAFTA. 25 Third, Chapter Nineteen
provides a mechanism for review of domestic antidumping and
countervailing duty determinations. 26
For purposes of this Note, Chapter’s Eleven, Fourteen, and
Twenty are relevant, because they are most applicable to the Rule.
Chapter Eleven provides substantive obligations that the Rule may
violate, 27 and also provides a recourse mechanism for investors.28
Chapter Fourteen provides substantive obligations that the Rule may
violate, 29 and Chapter Twenty provides a recourse mechanism to
parties for alleged Chapter Fourteen violations. 30
A. NAFTA Chapter Eleven

Chapter Eleven imposes three important substantive obligations
on parties. First, Articles 1102–04 impose an equal-treatment rule,
which requires parties to treat other parties’ investors and
investments 31 at least as favorably as it treats its own. 32 Second,
Article 1105 requires parties to treat investors of another party “in
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable

reports/tableview.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). Whereas, the $357.7
billion represented only 2.5% of the United States’ gross domestic
product
in
2009.
See
World
DataBank,
WORLD BANK,
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx (last
visited Mar. 12, 2014).
24.

See Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of Another
Party, supra note 14; see also NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1116.

25.

See Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures,
supra note 16; see also NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2004.

26.

See Review of Final Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
SECRETARIAT,
https://www.nafta-secDeterminations,
NAFTA
alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=93&language=en-US (last visited Mar. 12,
2014).

27.

See NAFTA, supra note 9, arts. 1102–04.

28.

See id. arts. 1115–39.

29.

See id. arts. 1401–16.

30.

Id. art. 2004.

31.

For the purposes of this Notes, the term “investment,” from this point
on, means NAFTA’s definition of “investment.” See NAFTA, supra note
9, art. 1139.

32.

See id. arts. 1102–04.
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treatment and full protection and security.” 33 Third, Article 1110
requires parties to avoid nationalizing or expropriating investments of
investors of other parties, unless it is done for a public purpose, on a
non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with due process and a
minimum standard of treatment under international law, and the
expropriating or nationalizing party provides a payment of
compensation. 34
The second part of Chapter Eleven focuses on the dispute
mechanism, which allows an investor to choose from three arbitral
tribunals for an alleged NAFTA violation by a party: (1) the World
Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID); (2) ICSID’s Additional Facility Rules; and (3) the rules of
the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL Rules). 35 Additionally, an investor may choose to bring
a NAFTA claim for damages in a domestic court. 36 But an investor
would have to waive her right to initiate or continue any action in
domestic court if she wanted to seek arbitration in a NAFTA
tribunal. 37 Chapter Eleven is unique in that it provides a private right
of action, which is a departure from the traditional exclusive state-tostate dispute resolution mechanisms available in most international
agreements. 38 Before the Trade Act of 2002, 39 the United States was
skeptical that frivolous Chapter Eleven claims would stifle legitimate
policy efforts, 40 because if an investor wins a Chapter Eleven claim,
33.

Id. art. 1105.

34.

See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1110(1).

35.

Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of Another
Party, supra note 14; see also NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1120.

36.

See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1121(1)(b).

37.

See id. This waiver, however, does not apply to “proceedings for
injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief.” Id.

38.

See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of
Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365,
372 (2003). For an argument in support of private rights of action in
international agreements, see Alan O. Sykes, Public v. Private
Enforcement of International Economic Law: Of Standing and Remedy
(John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 235, 2005), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html.39.Trade
Act
of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002) [hereinafter Trade Act].

39.

Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002)
[hereinafter Trade Act].

40.

See id. at 385 (“During debate on an appropriations bill, a congressman
lamented that the Justice Department might have to sue local
governments to enforce NAFTA decisions, and in a burst of fervor
proclaimed, ‘This is nuts! We must stand together to protect the
sovereignty of American laws.” Id. (citing 145 CONG. REC. H7368 (Aug.
5, 1999) (statement of Rep. Shows)).
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the losing party is left to pay the damages through taxes. 41 The Trade
Act of 2002, however, provided a means to eliminate frivolous
Chapter Eleven claims against the United States. 42 A final arbitration
award is binding on the investor and the party to the arbitration, and
the losing party is required to enforce the award. 43
B. NAFTA Chapter Fourteen

Chapter Fourteen covers financial services, which are broadly
defined. 44 Chapter Fourteen imposes only substantive obligations on
parties, and redirects its recourse mechanism to Chapter Twenty,
except that a Chapter Fourteen claim will require a panel of financial
services experts, which is a slight modification to normal ChapterTwenty procedures. 45 Article 1401 sets out the Chapter’s scope and
coverage, which includes any measures 46 related to financial
institutions, 47 or any cross-border trade in financial services. 48 Similar
to the equal treatment rule in Chapter Eleven, parties must treat
investors of financial institutions, financial institutions, and crossborder financial services providers of other parties, at least as
favorably as its treats its own. 49

41.

Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims Under NAFTA and
Other U.S. “Trade” Deals, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Feb. 2014),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/investor-state-chart.pdf
(“If
a
corporation wins its investor-state case, the taxpayers of the ‘losing’
country must foot the bill. More than $430 million in compensation has
already been paid out to corporations in a series of investor-state cases
under NAFTA-style deals.”).

42.

See Alvarez & Park, supra note 37, at 386 (citing Trade Act, supra note
26, § 2102(b)(3)(G-H)).

43.

See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1136 (“Each Party shall provide for the
enforcement of an award in its territory.”).

44.

NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1416 (“[F]inancial service means a service of
financial nature, including insurance, and a service incidental or
auxiliary to a service of a financial nature.”).

45.

See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1414(1) (“Section B of Chapter Twenty .
. . applies as modified by this Article to the settlement of disputes
arising under this Chapter.”); see also NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1414.

46.

“[M]easure includes any law, regulation, procedure, requirement, or
practice.” NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 201(1)

47.

“[F]inancial institution means any financial intermediary or other
enterprise that is authorized to do business and regulated or supervised
as a financial institution under the law of the Party in whose territory it
is located.” NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1416.

48.

See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1401.

49.

See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1405.
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C. NAFTA Chapter Twenty

Chapter Twenty provides parties with a dispute settlement
mechanism regarding the interpretation or application of any part of
NAFTA. 50 The dispute settlement procedure outlined in Chapter
Twenty begins with party-to-party consultations. 51 If a settlement is
not reached, then a party may request a review by the Free Trade
Commission (FTC), and if the FTC cannot resolve the dispute, a
party may request a panel decision. 52 The FTC is made up of
ministerial representatives of each party, and is in charge of
implementing NAFTA and resolving any party disputes and
overseeing the dispute settlement procedures outlined in Chapter
Twenty. 53
Enforcement of Chapter Twenty panel decisions is largely left up
to the parties. 54 If a Chapter Twenty claim is followed through, the
panel will publish a report containing its findings of fact, a
determination of whether a party has violated its NAFTA obligations,
and any recommendations to resolve the dispute. 55 A panel’s decision,
however, is nonbinding, and the parties must resolve the dispute on
their own. 56 The parties have a good-faith obligation to abide by the
panel’s decision, but if a party does not abide, for whatever reason,
the aggrieved party has the power to retaliate. 57 The retaliatory
power remains in effect indefinitely, and if a settlement cannot be
met, the nonconforming party may pay the aggrieved party
compensation. 58

50.

See Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures,
supra note 16.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.

See Free Trade Commission, NAFTANOW, http://www.naftanow.org/
about/default_en.asp (last modified Aug. 9, 2013). The Free Trade
Commission, made up of ministerial representatives from NAFTA
parties, “supervises the implementation and further elaboration of the
[NAFTA] and helps resolve disputes arising from its interpretation.” Id.;
see also NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2001.

54.

See generally John C. Thomure, Jr., Star Chamber Accountability:
Appellate Review of Nafta Chapter 20 Panel Decisions, 28 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1997).

55.

See Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures,
supra note 16.

56.

See Thomure, supra note 53, at 640.

57.

Id. at 641 (citing NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2019(2)(a)).

58.

See Thomure, supra note 53, at 640 (citing NAFTA, supra note 9, art.
2018(2)).
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III. The Volcker Rule Still Violates NAFTA
The Rule presents a new type of challenge for NAFTA and its
parties because it infringes parties’ ability to regulate their own
financial institutions. 59 On its face, the Rule treats United States
sovereign debt securities more favorably than foreign debt securities
by exempting only the United States securities from the Rule’s
restrictions. 60 The assurances of bank-regulation sovereignty provided
by provisions of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement—NAFTA’s
predecessor—and NAFTA, seemed tenuous with the Rule’s
inception. 61
Canadian finance leaders have expressed their concern that the
Rule will increase financing costs for the Canadian government, which
will make it more difficult to pay off debt and support social
programs. 62 Before the Rule’s final regulations were published,
Canada’s Finance Minister stated, in a letter to the United States
Treasury Secretary, that the Rule, “as currently drafted would have
an unprecedented extraterritorial reach and significant cross-border
effects, which would be particularly problematic for Canada, given the
close inter-linkages between the Canadian and U.S. financial
systems.” 63 The five largest Canadian banks, in their letter to the
United States agencies in charge of implementing the Rule, argued
that Rule’s disparate treatment of United States and Canadian debt
securities will reduce the market liquidity for Canadian securities
worldwide, place Canadian banks at a competitive disadvantage
compared the United States banks, and the banks also argued that
the disparate treatment violates the United States’ obligations under
NAFTA. 64

59.

See John Turley-Ewart, Volcker Rule Release Will Be Banking’s Test
POST
(Dec.
9,
2013,
5:00
PM),
for
NAFTA,
FIN.
http://opinion.financialpost.com/2013/12/09/volcker-rule-release-willbe-bankings-test-for-nafta/; see generally Canadian Banks Letter, supra
note 9; EBF Letter, supra note 8.

60.

Volcker Rule, supra note 3, §1851(d)(1)(A) (“Notwithstanding the
restrictions [of the Rule] . . . the Securities and Exchange Commission . .
. may determine, the following activities are permitted: The purchase,
sale, acquisition, or disposition of obligations of the United States . . ..).
The Volcker Rule prominently excludes any possibility of exempting
foreign obligations. Id.

61.

See Turley-Ewart, supra note 58.

62.

Id.

63.

Id.

64.

See Canadian Banks Letter, supra note 9, at 7–8.
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A. The Volcker Rule’s Continuing Disparate Treatment

In the Rule’s proposed regulations, 65 only United States debt
securities were exempted from the Rule’s proprietary trading
prohibition, while other foreign debt securities were not, which
commanded Canadian financial institutions’ attention, in particular;66
“[t]he extraterritorial effects [of the Volcker Rule] . . . violate
Canada’s rights under [NAFTA] and are not justified by any evidence
that Canadian Public Funds have been, or are expected to be in the
future, a threat to the stability of the U.S. financial system which is
one of the principle goals of the Volcker Rule.” 67
The Rule’s final regulations, however, provide a limited
exemption for foreign debt securities, which Canadian banks viewed
as a huge victory. 68 But the exemption is not absolute; the Rule
continues to: (1) treat foreign sovereign securities differently than
United States sovereign securities; and (2) treat foreign banks
differently than United States banks. 69
First, the Rule continues to treat United States and foreign debt
securities differently. Foreign banks that operate in the United States
may engage in proprietary trading in the sovereign securities of the
country whose laws they are organized under 70 but the exemption
does not permit United States banks to engage in proprietary trading
of any foreign debt securities. 71 And, the exemption does not apply to
foreign securities if the foreign bank is a depository bank. 72
Second, the Rule continues to treat United States banks and
foreign banks differently. Again, the exemption does not apply to
65.

See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain
Interests in, and Relationship With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity
Funds (proposed Oct. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 248
& 351 & 17 C.F.R. pt. 255) [hereinafter Proposed Regulations], available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/34-65545.pdf.

66.

See Alini, supra note 12 (“This sent off alarm bells north of the border.
Twenty percent of Canadian government bonds are held by nonresidents, with two-thirds of them being held residing with U.S. financial
institutions, former Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney noted in a
letter to Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke.”). The Rule’s proposed
regulations left the possibility of exempting foreign debt securities open;
one of the questions asked whether the regulators “[should] adopt an
additional exemption for proprietary trading in the obligations of foreign
governments . . .?”). Proposed Regulations, supra note 64, at 72.

67.

Canadian Banks Letter, supra note 9, at 2.

68.

Alini, supra note 51; see Final Regulations, supra note 11, at 404.

69.

See Final Regulations, supra note 11, at 404.

70.

See id.

71.

See id. at 405.

72.

See id. at 390–96.
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foreign banks that are depository banks, while the exemption
continues to cover United States depository banks. 73 In effect, the
Rule allows United States depository banks to engage in proprietary
trading in their own sovereign securities, but prohibits foreign banks
with United States operations from doing the same.
B.

NAFTA Chapter Eleven Violation

The Rule certainly violates the spirit of the United States’
obligations under Chapter Eleven, 74 but an investor bringing a
Chapter Eleven claim against the United States would face a
definitional barrier. Recall that Chapter Eleven requires parties to
treat investments of other parties at least as favorably as it treats its
own. 75 On its face, the Rule ostensibly violates this obligation by
treating United States debt securities more favorably than foreign
ones. 76 The definition of investment, however, is controlling; the last
section of Chapter Eleven defines investment as a debt security, but
this definition, “does not include a debt security . . . of a state
enterprise.” 77 Presumably then, this exclusion would foreclose the
possibility of any challenges by investors.
The Rule, however, violates the United States’ Chapter Eleven
obligations to investors who hold equity interests 78 in foreign banks
that are subject to the Rule’s restrictions. Article 1102 requires the
United States to treat investors and investments of investors of other
parties at least as favorably as it treats its own “in like
73.

See id. at 390–96, 405; see also Client Alert, MORRISON FOERSTER (Dec.
12, 2013), http://www.iflr.com/pdfs/ Impact Foreign Banking
Organisations.pdf (explaining that foreign banks can trade in their own
debt securities if “[t]he U.S. affiliate is not controlled by a top-tier U.S.
banking entity; [t]he government obligations are issued or guaranteed by
the foreign banking entity’s country government . . .; and [t]he U.S.
affiliate is note an insured depository institution”).

74.

One of the objectives of NAFTA is to “increase substantially investment
opportunities in the territories of the Parties,” and the parties are
required to interpret NAFTA in light of this objective, and others.
NAFTA, supra, note 9, art. 102.

75.

See NAFTA, supra note 9, arts. 1102–04.

76.

See Final Regulations, supra note 11, at 404.

77.

NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1139. A “state enterprise” is defined as “an
enterprise that is owned, or controlled through ownership interests, by a
Party,” which would make Canadian debt securities fall within this
exclusion and not be subject to the United States’ Chapter Eleven
obligations. Id. art. 201(1).

78.

NAFTA includes, “an equity interest of [any entity constituted or
organized under applicable law . . . including any corporation, trust,
partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture or other association],” as
an investment. NAFTA, supra note 9, arts. 1139(b), 201.
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circumstances.” 79 The Rule, however, by permitting United States
depository banks to engage in proprietary trading in its own debt
securities, but not foreign ones, treats foreign banks less favorably,
and thereby treats investors of those banks and their investments in
those banks less favorably than United States investors and
investments “in like circumstances.” 80
C.

NAFTA Chapter Fourteen Violation

The Canadian banks’ argument that the Rule violates the United
States’ Chapter Fourteen obligations, even after the Rule’s final
regulations allayed the Rule’s extraterritorial reach, is merited. 81 If a
party brought a Chapter Fourteen claim against the United States,
however, it would be the first of its kind. 82 The pertinent provision of
Chapter Fourteen, Article 1405, prohibits a party from treating
financial institutions of another party any less favorably than it treats
its own. 83 The Rule, by allowing United States depository banks and
not foreign depository banks to engage in proprietary trading in their
own sovereign debt securities, seemingly violates this provision,
especially in regards to Canada, because Canadian debt securities are
“a core product offering of Canadian-based financial institutions.” 84
79.

See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1102.

80.

See Final Regulations, supra note 11, at 390–96, 404; Canadian Banks
Letter, supra note 9, at 9 (“Considering that Canadian Public Funds are
a core product offering of Canadian-based financial institutions, in the
same way that U.S. Public Funds are a core product offering of financial
institutions primarily based in the U.S., Canadian Banks’ ability to deal
with our core products on a level playing field is clearly prejudiced by
the discriminatory definition of ‘covered fund.’”).

81.

See Canadian Banks Letter, supra note 9, at 8; see also Barbara
Shecter, What the Volcker Rule Means for Canada’s Biggest Banks, FIN.
POST
(Dec.
10,
2013,
6:02
PM),
http://business.
financialpost.com/2013/12/10/volcker-rule-canada-banks/.

82.

STATE
DEP’T,
NAFTA
Investor-State
Arbitrations,
U.S.
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014)
(enumerating a list of NAFTA cases filed against the United States,
Canada, and Mexico, none of which have involved Chapter Fourteen.).

83.

NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1405(2) (“Each Party shall accord to
financial institutions of another Party . . . treatment no less favorable
than that it accords to its own financial institutions . . . with respect to
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation, and sale or other disposition of financial institutions and
investments.”).

84.

See Canadian Banks Letter, supra note 9, at 8; Final Regulations, supra
note 11, at 405 (“By not permitting proprietary trading in foreign
sovereign debt in insured depository institutions . . . the exemption
limits the direct risks of these activities to insured depository
institutions in keeping with the statute.”).
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If faced with a Chapter Fourteen claim from a party, based on
the Rule, the United States could argue that the broad exception in
Article 1410 protects it from any kind of liability. 85 Article 1410
provides a list of exceptions to the parties’ Chapter Fourteen
obligations, including an exception for measures taken to, “ensur[e]
the integrity and stability of a Party’s financial system.” 86 The United
States could argue that the Rule was passed specifically to prevent
another financial crisis, and therefore falls within the 1410 exception. 87
But this argument is without merit, because, as the Canadian banks
pointed out in their letter, the United States has presented no
evidence that Canadian debt securities contributed to the 2008
financial crisis, or will contribute to another financial crisis.88
Therefore, the United States cannot justify the Rule’s disparate
treatment under Article 1410.
In sum, although the Rule’s final regulations allay its
extraterritorial effects on foreign financial institutions, the Rule
continues to treat United States securities and banks differently than
foreign securities and banks “in like circumstances,” and is therefore
subject to potential challenges under Chapters Eleven and Twenty.89
Part IV, by considering relevant past decisions by NAFTA tribunals,
explores how these challenges might play out.

IV. The Futility of NAFTA in Effectively Remedying
the Volcker Rule’s NAFTA Violations
The two NAFTA recourse mechanisms available for challenging
the Rule are under Chapters Eleven and Twenty, and have been
described in Part II of this Note. Although the Rule ostensibly
violates the United States’ obligations under Chapter Eleven and
Fourteen, the recourse mechanisms available to investors and parties
would not provide meaningful remedies to compel the United States’
compliance.

85.

See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1410.

86.

Id.

87.

See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 2, pmbl.

88.

See Canadian Banks Letter, supra note 9, at 9.

89.

See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1102–04; id. art 1405(2). Recall, that
Chapter Fourteen does not contain a recourse mechanism. Instead, an
aggrieved party must employ the recourse mechanism in Chapter
Twenty. See id. art. 1416.

391

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
The Need for Additional NAFTA Remedies
A. NAFTA Chapter Eleven Claim

Under Chapter Eleven, whether an investor seeks recourse
through the United States courts or a NAFTA tribunal, 90 the
likelihood for successfully challenging the Rule as a violation of the
United States’ Chapter Eleven obligations based on past decisions, is
extremely low. Of the seventeen Chapter Eleven claims filed against
the United States, nine have been dismissed and the remaining eight
are pending. 91 Moreover, of the nine that were dismissed, four resulted
in NAFTA tribunal ordering the challenging investor to pay the
United States’ attorney fees. 92
1. United States Domestic Court

First, any NAFTA suit in a United States court would fail
outright. The Supreme Court, in Cohens v. State of Virginia,
recognized that the United States is immune from suit unless it
waives its immunity. 93 The United States, with respect to NAFTA
claims, has expressly maintained its immunity from anyone other
than the United States. 94 For example, in Berriochoa Lopez v. United
States, Mexican truck operators sued the United States for breaching
its obligations under NAFTA. 95 The Berriochoa Lopez court dismissed
the truck operators’ action because their claims against the United
States stemmed from NAFTA violations, which, the court recognized,
are barred. 96

90.

See Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of Another
Party, supra note 12; NAFTA supra note 9, art. 1121(1)(b).

91.

See Cases Filed Against the United States of America, U.S. STATE
DEP’T, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3741.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014)
(providing a list of all Chapter Eleven claims filed against the United
States and the outcomes).

92.

See id.

93.

Cohens v. State of Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 380 (1821).

94.

See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(c) (“No person other than the United States (1)
shall have any cause of action or defense under (A) the [NAFTA] or by
virtue of Congressional approval thereof . . . or (2) may challenge, in
any action brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction
by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United
States, any State, or any political subdivision of a State on the ground
that such action or inaction is inconsistent with the [NAFTA].”).

95.

Berriochoa Lopez v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d 22, 22 (D.D.C.
2004).

96.

Id. at 27. “The plain language of NAFTA Implementation Legislation
thus requires the dismissal of all suits whose sole claim to legal relief
stems from alleged noncompliance with NAFTA by federal or state
government officials.” Id. at 28.
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2. NAFTA Tribunal

Second, an investor’s chance at a NAFTA tribunal may not be
successful either, based on past Chapter Eleven decisions. Of the
seventeen Chapter Eleven claims filed against the United States, 97 two
decisions in particular illustrate the difficulties that an investor would
face if she chose to pursue a Chapter Eleven claim against the United
States based on the Rule’s alleged NAFTA violation. In Glamis Gold
Ltd. v. United States of America, 98 and Methanex Corp. v. United
States of America, 99 Canadian investors filed Chapter Eleven claims
against the United States and both decision resulted in dismissals
against the Canadian investors because their claims could not
withstand the standards set forth by NAFTA tribunals. 100
i. Past Chapter Eleven Decisions

The Glamis Gold decision set a high bar for challenging the Rule
under the Chapter Eleven expropriation or the fair and equitable
treatment clauses. In Glamix Gold, Glamis, a Canadian mining
company filed a NAFTA claim against the United States alleging that
the United States had breached its NAFTA Chapter Eleven
obligations because the federal government wrongfully delayed
Glamis’ proposed project, and the California legislature passed a law
that rendered Glamis’ project infeasible. 101 The Glamis Gold tribunal
concluded that although the value of Glamis Gold’s proposed project
had decreased from $49.1 million to $20 million, this was not a
“sufficient economic impact” to support its expropriation claim. 102 The
tribunal also concluded that the federal law and California law did
not reach the level of “egregiousness necessary to breach a fair and
equitable treatment standard of Article 1105.” 103 The tribunal went on
to conclude that the Chapter Eleven fair and equitable treatment
standard requires the measure to present, “a high level of shock,
arbitrariness, unfairness, and discrimination.” 104 The tribunal
97.

See Cases Filed Against the United States of America, supra note 90.

98.

See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Final
Award (June 8, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/125798.pdf [hereinafter Glamis Gold].

99.

See Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, NAFTA/UNCITRAL,
Final Award (Aug. 3, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/51052.pdf [hereinafter Methanex].

100. See Cases Filed Against the United States of America, supra note 90.
101. Glamis Gold, supra note 97, at 6.
102. Jordan C. Kahn, Striking NAFTA Gold: Glamis Advances InvestorState Arbitration, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 101, 130–33 (2009) (quoting
Glamis Gold, supra note 97, at 536).
103. Glamis Gold, supra note 97, at 353.
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dismissed Glamis’ claims and ordered it to pay two thirds of the
United States’ legal fees and arbitration costs. 105 Glamis Gold
demonstrates that the standard for analyzing Chapter Eleven
expropriation and fair and equitable treatment claims is extremely
high.
In Methanex, Methanex, a Canadian company that produced
methanol, sued the United States under the Chapter Eleven national
treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and expropriation clauses, for
$970 million in losses as a result of a California law that banned the
sale or use of a gasoline additive. 106 The Methanex tribunal concluded
that because there was no evidence that an illicit pretext underlay the
California law, and there was no evidence that the law was intended
to harm foreign investors or benefit domestic ones, the law did not
sufficiently “relate to” Methanex or its investments. 107 The Methanex
tribunal then dismissed Methanex’s claims, concluding that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case 108 and ordered Methanex to pay the
United States’ attorney fees and arbitral expenses, which amounted to
$4 million. 109
ii. Applying Past Chapter Eleven Decisions to the Volcker Rule

The Glamis Gold and Methanex decisions illustrate the hurdles
that investors challenging the Rule would have to jump. According to
the text of NAFTA, Chapter Eleven decisions have no binding force
on subsequent decisions. 110 NAFTA tribunals, however, are
admonished to communicate their reasons for diverging from previous
decisions. 111 Although there may not be a formal precedent rule, a
NAFTA tribunal would give due weight to previous decisions.112
104. Id.
105. See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, U.S. STATE DEP’T,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c10986.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
106. Methanex, supra note 98, at 1–2.
107. Id. at 292.
108. Methanex, supra note 98, at 292.
109. See Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, U.S. STATE DEP’T,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
110. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1136(1)(“An award by a Tribunal shall
have no binding force except as between the disputing parties and in
respect of the particular case.”).
111. See Glamis Gold, supra note 97, at 5.
112. Id. The Glamis Gold tribunal quoted Thomas Walde, who stated in
International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States,
NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Separate Opinion, ¶ 129 (Jan. 26, 2006), that
“[i]n international and international economic law—to which investment
arbitration properly belongs—there may not be a formal ‘stare decisis’
rule as in common law countries, but precedent plays an important role.
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Unless NAFTA tribunal found a compelling reason to diverge, an
investor bringing a Chapter Eleven claim against the United States
would, therefore, have to make out a claim sufficient enough to
withstand the standards set forth in Glamis Gold and Methanex.
An investor’s claim might fail outright on jurisdictional grounds
under the Methanex decision. The United States could argue that
there was no illicit pretext for the Rule and the Rule was not meant
to harm foreign investors or benefit domestic ones, and therefore the
Rule does not sufficiently “relate to” investors or their investments. 113
Even if NAFTA tribunal finds a sufficient connection between the
Rule and the investors or their investments, the investor would have
to show “sufficient economic impact,” 114 for an expropriation claim or,
“a high level of shock, arbitrariness, unfairness, and discrimination,” 115
for a fair and equitable treatment claim, under Glamis Gold. Either
way, investors bringing Chapter claims would face an up-hill battle to
successfully challenge the Rule as a NAFTA violation. 116

Tribunals and courts may disagree and are at full liberty to deviate
from specific awards, but it is hard to maintain that they can and
should not respect well-established jurisprudence. . . . The role of
precedent has been recognised de facto in the reasoning of tribunals, but
can also be formally inferred from Art. 1131(1) of NAFTA.” Id.
113. See Methanex, supra note 98, at 292; see also Final Regulations, supra
note 11, at 405 (“Thus, the Agencies have determined that this limited
exemption for proprietary trading in foreign sovereign obligations
promotes and protects the safety and soundness of banking entities and
also promotes and protects the financial stability of the United
States.”).
114. See Kahn, supra note 101, at 130–33.
115. See Glamis Gold, supra note 97, at 353.
116. See NAFTA 20 Years Later: Success or Failure, USA TODAY (Dec. 31,
2013, 1:41 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ news/world/2013/
12/31/nafta-20-years/4258905/ (“Mexico and Canada have paid out
about $350 million in damages to foreign investors, while the United
States hasn’t paid any . . . ‘The (arbitration) process is not like the
domestic court system, it’s not fair and open,’ said Scott Sinclair of the
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.”). The fairness of the Chapter
Eleven dispute resolution process is out of the scope of this Note,
however the lack of success that foreign investors have had in
challenging the United States provides some basis for predicting that a
similar challenge to the Rule would likewise, be unsuccessful.
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B. NAFTA Chapter Twenty Claim

The likelihood of success for challenging the Rule is probably
much higher for a party under Chapter Twenty than an investor
under Chapter Eleven, based on previous panel decisions. 117 Chapter
Twenty forecloses any possibility of a NAFTA action in one of the
parties’ domestic courts by another party. 118 So far, there have been
three published Chapter Twenty panel decisions. 119 Of these three
panel decisions, two involved claims against the United States, and
both of these panels concluded that the United States had violated its
NAFTA obligations. 120 A successful challenge to the Rule, however,
does not necessarily mean that a challenging party would get what
they want; a Chapter Twenty panel decision is not binding on the
losing party and the panel would not have the authority to overturn
the Rule. 121

117. Recall that a party challenging the Rule would bring a claim for the
United States’ violation of its Chapter Fourteen obligations, but the
recourse mechanism for Chapter Fourteen claims is Chapter Twenty.
See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1414.
118. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2021 (“No party may provide for a right
of action under domestic law against any other Party on the ground
that a measure of another Party is inconsistent with [NAFTA].”).
119. See Decisions and Reports, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.naftasec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=95&language=en-US (last visited Mar.
12, 2014). The three decisions listed are: (1) In the matter of Tariffs
Applied by Canada to Certain U.S. Origin Agricultural Products, which
was brought by the Untied States against Canada; (2) In the matter of
the U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on Broom Corn Brooms from Mexico,
brought by Mexico against the United States; and, (3) In the matter of
Cross-Border Trucking Services, brought by Mexico against the United
States. Id.
120. See In the matter of the U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on Broom Corn
Brooms from Mexico, USA-97-2008-01, Final Report of the Panel, Jan.
1, 1998, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta20/brooms.pdf
[hereinafter Broom Corn Brooms]; see also In the matter of CrossBorder Trucking Services, USA-Mex-1998-2008-01, Final Report of the
Panel, Feb. 6, 2001, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
nafta20/truckingservices.pdf [hereinafter Cross-Border Trucking].
121. See Marcia J. Staff & Christine W. Lewis, Arbitration Under NAFTA
Chapter 11: Past, Present, and Future, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 301, 315
(2003) (“Chapter 20 panels have no power to actually overturn United
States law. Rather, the panels issue reports that allow the United States
to decide what course of ation to take in the event a given law is found
to violate NAFTA . . ..”); see also Thomure, supra note 53, at 642
(“Geared to facilitating agreement, Chapter 20 neither decides cases nor
calculates damages.”).
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1. Previous Chapter Twenty Decisions Involving the United States

In the matter of the U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on Broom Corn
Brooms from Mexico involved a claim by Mexico that the United
States had violated its Chapter Eight obligations. 122 Mexico argued
that the United States International Trade Commission’s definition of
“like product,” was inconsistent with NAFTA Chapter Eight. 123 The
panel concluded that the United States International Trade
Commission’s definition was inconsistent with the United States’
NAFTA obligations and recommended that the United States bring
its practice in compliance with such obligations. 124
In the matter of cross-border trucking services involved a claim
by Mexico that the United States, by refusing to permit Mexican
investment in companies in the United States that provided
transportation of international cargo, had breached its NAFTA
obligations under Chapter Eleven’s national treatment clause. 125 The
panel concluded that the United States’ “blanket” discrimination
against Mexican investors violated its Chapter Eleven obligations.126
Again, the panel recommended that the United States take the
necessary steps to bring its practices in compliance with its NAFTA
obligations. 127
2. Applying Past Chapter Twenty Decisions to the Volcker Rule

The two aforementioned decisions illustrate that, although no
Chapter Twenty claim involving a Chapter Fourteen allegation has
122. See Broom Corn Brooms, supra note 119, at 2.
123. See David A. Gantz, Dispute Settlement Under NAFTA and the WTO:
Choice of Forum Opportunities and Risks for NAFTA Parties, 14 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 1025, 1069–70 (1999).
124. See Broom Corn Brooms, supra note 119, at 29.
125. See Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 119, at 1.
126. Id. at 90. “The deprivation of the right to obtain operating authority to
U.S. companies owned or controlled by Mexican nationals and the
prohibition on allowing Mexican investors to acquire U.S. companies
that already have operating authority, on its face, violates the straightforward provisions of NAFTA Articles 1102 and 1103. Because the
United States expressly prohibits the above mentioned investment, this
Panel finds such prohibitions as inconsistent with NAFTA, even if
Mexico cannot identify a particular Mexican national or nationals that
have been rejected.” Id. at 89 (emphasis added). This conclusion would
make it easier for Canada to challenge the Rule because Canada would
not need to identify any of its financial institutions that were actually
affected by the Rule, but need only argue that the “blanket”
discrimination imposed by the Rule violates the United States’ Chapter
Fourteen obligations to treat its financial institutions equally. See
NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1404.
127. See Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 119, at 91.
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ever been decided, successful Chapter Twenty claims are possible,
specifically against the United States. A successful Chapter Twenty
claim means very little, however, unless it compels the violating party
to take action in order to rectify its violation, which is where the
Chapter Twenty remedy is lacking. 128 In both Chapter Twenty
decisions against the United States, the United States’ compliance
was slow. 129 For example, in In the matter of cross-border trucking
services, it took almost four years before any sort of effort was made
by the United States to comply with the panel’s decision. 130 Mexican
investors still contend that the United States has failed to comply; in
2009, Canacar, a trade association representing individual carriers
within the Mexican trucking industry, filed a claim against the United
States for its alleged noncompliance with the In the matter of crossborder trucking services decision. 131 The case is still pending. 132
Assuming arguendo that a party succeeds on a Chapter Twenty
claim alleging that the Rule violates the United States’ NAFTA
obligations, the deciding panel would only have the power to
recommend that the United States comply. 133 Moreover, it is unlikely
that the United States would comply based on the Rule’s political
128. See Staff, supra note 120, at 315; see also Patricia Isela Hansen, Dispute
Settlement in NAFTA and Beyond, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 417, 418 (2005)
(“As in the WTO, however, the threat of sanctions has not always been
sufficient to produce compliance with panel decisions in politically
sensitive cases.”).
129. See Rafael Leal-Arcas, Comparative Analysis of NAFTA’s Chapter 20
and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding 3 (Queen Mary Univ.
of London, Sch. of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 94, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/absrtact=1969827; see also David A.
Gantz, Government-to-Government Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA’s
Chapter 20: A Commentary on the Process, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
481, 517 (“Ultimately, the United States declined to comply with the
[Broom Corn Brooms] panel ruling immediately, maintaining safeguards
in place for nine months after issuance of the panel decision.”).
130. See Hansen, supra note 127, at 418 (“Almost four years later, the
United States still is not in compliance with that decision. After
considerable delay, the Bush administration finally sought to permit
entry by Mexican trucks . . . but a new policy has not yet been
implemented.”); see also Marc Sher, Chapter 20 Dispute Resolution
Under NAFTA: Fact or Fiction?, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1001,
1018 (2003) (“The Congressional response to the panel decision
emphasizes that non-binding arbitration and the consultations and
meetings that precede them may not be the most effective method of
handling disputes between NAFTA parties.”).
131. See Canacar v. United States of America, U.S. STATE DEP’T,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c29831.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
132. See id.
133. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2018.
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weight, 134 and the statutory language of the United States’ NAFTA
implementation statute, which nullifies any NAFTA provision that is
inconsistent with United States law. 135 Because the panel’s decision
cannot compel the United States to act, the only available remedy to
the aggrieved party would be retaliatory measures in the form of
suspending benefits to the United States, “of equivalent effect until
such time as [the parties] have reached agreement on a resolution of
the dispute.” 136 Moreover, any retaliatory action is limited by other
international agreements. 137 Presumably then, an aggrieved party
could impose sanctions on United States banks with Canadian
branches only equivalent to the Rule’s restrictions on foreign banks
with United States branches.
In sum, although the Rule ostensibly violates NAFTA, the
recourse mechanisms available to parties and investors are inadequate
in providing remedies to induce parties’ compliance with panel
decisions or deter future NAFTA violations. Even if an investor is
able to mount a Chapter Eleven argument and skirt around NAFTA’s
prominent exclusion of sovereign debt securities as “investments,” 138 it
seems unlikely that she could meet the seemingly insurmountable
standards established in Glamis Gold and Methanex. 139 Moreover, a
party bringing a Chapter Twenty claim against the United States,
even if successful, would not be able to compel the United States to

134. Remarks by the President on Financial Reform, supra note 5 (“Over the
past two years, more than seven million Americans have lost their jobs
in the deepest recession our country has known in generations . . . [w]e
have to enact common-sense reforms that will protect American
taxpayers—and the American economy—from future crises as well . . .
[i]t’s for these reasons that I’m proposing a simple and common-sense
reform, which we’re calling the ‘Volcker Rule’ . . . [m]y message to
member of Congress of both parties is that we have to get this done.”);
see also Opening Statement by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, BD. GOVS.
FED. RES. SYS. (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20131210a-bernanke-statement.htm
(talking about the efforts made to finally implement the Volcker Rule
and the Rule’s importance).
135. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a)(1) (“No provision of the [NAFTA], nor the
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, which
is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.”).
136. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2019.
137. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 128, at 21 (“Any retaliation or suspension of
concessions taken by the aggrieved party is capped by WTO obligations.
This means that the complaining Party may not transgress its WTO
tariff bindings or other obligations to gain compensation for a ruling
under a NAFTA panel.”).
138. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1139.
139. See Glamis Gold, supra note 97; Methanex, supra note 98.
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act in compliance of its NAFTA obligations, and it is unlikely that
the United States would act on its own to comply. 140

V. Additional Remedies for NAFTA Violations
The enactment of the Rule, and its apparent NAFTA violations,
illustrate that the remedies currently available under NAFTA are
insufficient to deter a party from future NAFTA violations. Two
additional steps toward compliance with panel decisions and
preventing NAFTA violations in the first place, are: (1) an appellate
review tribunal for Chapter Twenty panel decisions; 141 and (2) the
grant of power to Chapter Twenty panels to assess monetary
penalties on noncomplying parties. These steps are based on the
World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement procedures, 142 which
allow for appellate review of panel decisions, temporary compensation
to aggrieved parties, and more enforcement power to panels. 143
A. Appellate Review of Chapter Twenty Decisions

One way to address the issue of noncompliance of Chapter
Twenty panel decisions, which has been explored by previous
scholars, 144 is by establishing a system of appellate review, similar to
the World Trade Organization’s appellate review system. 145 As
NAFTA stands, parties are largely left to rely on their own
diplomatic relations with each other to arrive at a mutually
140. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2018; see also Remarks by the President
on Financial Reform, supra note 5 (arguing that the Volcker Rule is
crucial to ensure the United States’ financial stability in the future); 19
U.S.C. § 3312(a)(1).
141. See Thomure, supra note 53, at 658–59 (arguing for appellate review of
Chapter 20 decisions).
142. See Functions, objectives and Key Features of the Dispute Settlement
System, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/
dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s3p1_e.htm (last visited Mar. 13,
2014) (providing an overview of the WTO disputes settlement
procedures).
143. See id.; see also Thomure, supra note 53, at 656–57 (“The WTO’s
dispute resolution process, a legalistic regime, includes rules and
procedures designed to facilitate efficient, well-reasoned settlement and
resolution of disputes by way of strict deadlines, appellate review to
correct panel penalties for gross misconduct, and broader enforcement
power of panel decisions.”).
144. See generally, Thomure, supra note 53.
145. See id. at 658-59; see also Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 17, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401, available at http://www.wto.org/english/ docs_e/
legal_e/28-dsu.pdf [hereinafter DSU].
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satisfactory resolution. 146 This may present problems of
noncompliance when parties have strained diplomatic relations. 147
Under Chapter Twenty, appellate review is possible without all
three parties’ explicit approval. 148 Article 2001 grants the FTC the
power to “establish its rules and procedures” to carry out its duty to
resolve NAFTA disputes among the parties. 149 Appellate review of
Chapter Twenty panel decisions could promote compliance by parties
by: (1) providing more assurance to losing parties that panels are not
unfairly influenced by political forces; 150 and (2) providing more
assurance to losing parties that the panel decisions are decided
correctly. 151 Although appellate review of panel decisions would
promote the integrity of their decisions, it would not necessarily
provide a deterrent for future NAFTA violations.
B. Compensation for Noncompliance with Chapter Twenty Decisions

Another way to address parties’ noncompliance with panel
decisions is by assessing substantial monetary penalties upon losing
parties if they choose to continue violating their NAFTA obligations.
Comparatively, the World Trade Organization allows compensation
as a temporary measure for noncompliance with panel decisions. 152
Again, although the FTC cannot compel compliance, it may establish
“rules and procedures” in carrying out its duties to resolve disputes
among the parties. 153 The FTC therefore, could insist that, as a part
of a panel’s decision, the panel must conduct an assessment of
appropriate compensation that the losing party must pay to the
146. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 128, at 22.
147. See id.
148. Thomure, supra note 53, at 658 (“[T]he Commision has the authority to
establish rules providing for appellate review of panel decisions as
proposed in this Article without having to enact enabling legislation in
the Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. legislatures.”).
149. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2001(4).
150. See Thomure, supra note 53, at 658; see also Leal-Arcas, supra note 128,
at 22 (“Because of the less detailed rules under NAFTA, winning parties
might face a more difficult time to bring a dispute to resolution than
they would under a more rule-based approach in the WTO.”)
151. See Thomure, supra note 53, at 658
152. See DSU, supra note 144, art. 22 para. 1 (“Compensation and the
suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary measures
available in the even that the recommendations and rulings are not
implemented within a reasonable period of time. However, neither
compensation nor suspension of concessions or other obligations is
preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a
measure into conformity with the covered agreements.”).
153. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2001(4).
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prevailing party if the losing party continues to violate its NAFTA
obligations. If the assessment of damages is outside the realm of the
panel’s expertise, the FTC may “establish, and delegate
responsibilities to, ad hoc or standing committees, working groups or
expert groups,” 154 which could be responsible for assessing the
damages. Moreover, for some claims, the panel must consist of
experts. 155 For example, in a claim arising under Chapter Fourteen
(Financial Services), the panel must consist of financial services
experts. 156
An assessment of damages upon the losing party balances the
disputing parties’ interests. First, it addresses the aggrieved party’s
interests by providing it monetary compensation to make up for any
loss incurred as a result of the other party’s violation. Second, it
addresses the violating party’s interest by allowing it to continue
violating its NAFTA obligations if it determines that the benefits of
its continued violation outweigh the value of the compensation it
would have to provide the aggrieved party.
In sum, there may not be a panacea for effective prevention of
NAFTA violations, or effective enforcement of Chapter Twenty panel
decisions. 157 Presumably, the parties contemplated an imperfect
system by leaving enforcement of NAFTA disputes mostly up to
themselves. 158 But creating an appellate review system to bolster the
integrity of panel decisions, as well as imposing monetary penalties
against losing parties, provides two additional steps toward inducing
noncomplying parties to comply or alternatively, toward inducing
parties to take precautionary measures to ensure that they do not
violate NAFTA in the first place. The aforementioned steps could be
especially effective, compared to other international agreements,
because of the close ties between NAFTA parties. 159

154. See id. art. 2001(3)(a).
155. See Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures,
supra note 16.
156. See NAFTA, supra note, art. 1414(4).
157. See Sher, supra note 129, at 1025 (arguing for more effective
enforcement of NAFTA panel decisions).
158. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2003 (“The Parties shall at all times
endeavor to agree on the interpretation and application of this
Agreement, and shall make every attempt through cooperation and
consultations to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any
matter that might affect its operation.”).
159. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 128, at 22 (arguing that the close ties
between Mexico, Canada, and the United could “serve as a catalyst for
quicker, less delayed compliance,” than other international agreements,
like the WTO).
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VI. Conclusion
Twenty years after its inception, NAFTA’s results have been
applauded by some and ridiculed by others. 160 Further, some argue
that NAFTA and globalization generally are losing momentum.161
Whether NAFTA has lived up to its objectives the parties set out, to
“promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area,” 162 and
“increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of
the Parties,” is debatable. 163 Either way, the Rule is a new challenge,
and the FTC could use it as an impetus to revamp NAFTA, by
implementing steps to induce compliance in the future, in accordance
with another one of NAFTA’s objectives, which is to “create effective
procedures for the implementation and application of [NAFTA], for
its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes.” 164
The Rule’s passage and the futility of NAFTA recourse
mechanisms in place in providing any meaningful remedy, show that
the FTC needs to take further steps to ensure that parties are
complying with their NAFTA obligations. Although the FTC does
not have the power to compel the parties to comply with panel
decisions, 165 it may take steps to induce them to act in accordance
with their NAFTA obligations by: (1) bolstering the integrity of panel
decisions by creating an appellate review system; 166 and (2) assessing
160. See Julián Aguilar, Twenty Years Later, Nafta Remains a Source of
Tension, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.7, 2012) (“[E]conomists are calling the North
American Free Trade Agreement a resounding success, crediting for
fueling unprecedented trade and creating millions of jobs in the Untied
States.. . . But critics of Nafta say ithas [sic] resulted in a loss of United
States manufacturing and shipping jobs and in less production oversight.
They say Nafta has also displace Mexican agricultural workers into
other sectors or forced them to immigrate illegally to the United
States.”).
161. See John Jacobs, Is Globalization Losing Momentum, CANADIAN
CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES (June 14, 2005), https://
www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/commentary/globalizationlosing-momentum; see also NAFTA 20 Years Later: Success or Failure,
supra note 115 (“NAFTA is almost forgotten in the latest controversial
free-trade effort, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a negotiation among 12
countries, including NAFTA’s three, to open trade between Asia and
the Americas.”).
162. NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 102(b).
163. Id. art. 102(c).
164. Id. art. 102(e).
165. Id. art. 2001. NAFTA does not contain any provision granting power to
the Free Trade Commission to compel parties to act in accordance to
the their obligations; the Commission may, “take such other action in
the exercise of its functions as the Parties may agree.” Id.
166. See Thomure, supra note 53, at 658.
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substantial monetary damages to be paid to the aggrieved party if the
violating party does not correct its violation. Again, these are not
panaceas for NAFTA noncompliance issues, but they are practical
steps in the right direction. 167

167. Recall, these steps appear to be within the Free Trade Commission’s
authority under NAFTA, without having to seek the approval of all
three parties. See NAFTA, supra art. 2001; see also Thomure, supra
note 53, at 658. Ideally, making NAFTA panel decisions binding would
provide a stronger enforcement mechanism. This, however, would
require the consent of all three parties, which may not be practical. But
see Sher, supra note 129, at 1025 (arguing that it is in the United
States’ best interest for the parties should agree to increase the
enforcement powers of NAFTA tribunals).
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